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iii Unfortunately, the Vice President misspoke. As of the writing of this paper, the insurgency in Iraq continues and although the United States is slowly gaining ground, the end is far from near. The question on everyone's mind is how do we win, quickly? The short answer is we don't, but that doesn't mean we can't, eventually.
Nearly all successful insurgencies throughout history have enjoyed some form of external support. Whether it takes the form of political, financial, or military assistance, insurgencies are often dependent upon this external support for their survival. It logically follows then that removing this support will severely reduce an insurgency's chances of success.
Background
Insurgencies are not a new development in warfare. The Romans fought countless campaigns against rebellions in Iberia, Gaul, Judea, and Britainnia. Napoleon had his Insurgency however, is not always subject to the algebraic equation of forces. If it were so, then a state would only need to maintain overwhelming force to ensure stability.
Clausewitz himself stated that, "superiority of numbers in a given engagement is only one of the factors that determine victory. Still, regarding the factor of force, the advantage lay squarely on the American side. Or did it? America was a nuclear power, but it is not enough to have superior force unless you're willing to use it. The Soviets and Chinese did not limit their support for North
Vietnam to military hardware and expertise. They also provided a much more potent weapon, nuclear deterrence. 25 In addition to the time and space it already enjoyed, Hizbollah now had force, courtesy of external support.
Some would argue that Hizbollah is more an extension of Syrian and Iranian influence than a true insurgency, but that is not the case. Despite its ideological ties to
Iranian Shia doctrine, Hizbollah willingly asserts its independence as it continues to grow in strength. Additionally, the movement still professes its dedication to transforming Another example is found in the Malay Emergency of the early 1950's. When communists in the Malay Peninsula rebelled, the British were able to successfully isolate the insurgents and prevented any external assistance from reaching them. Malay is a peninsula and the British were able to control the borders and the maritime approaches.
"Over time it was UK/ GOM success in separating the active insurgents from this support which reduced the insurgency to minor proportions." 33 In some cases, it may not be possible to gain control of the border to remove external support, but compelling a supporter to withhold aid can produce a similar effect.
Following World War II, the United States successfully countered a communist insurgency in Greece. The communists were attempting to supplant the pro-western government in Athens and were supported by Tito. The rugged mountainous terrain was uncontrolled, and the insurgents "enjoyed lavish material aid and military guidance from First, "democracies fail in small wars because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory." 39 This is not to say that democracies are above brutality. Countless Japanese and German cities lay in ruins as a result of democratic brutality by the end of World War II. However, World War II was a war fought on a global scale for national survival. An insurgency is a small war.
Secondly, a democratic government's mandate only extends to the next election.
General Washington inherently understood this concept and used it to his advantage against the British. By using the spacious interior of the country, Washington was able to avoid capture, buying time for the Revolution. The British public was already divided on the morality of the war. The longer Washington was able to stave off defeat, the more dissatisfied the British became with their government. Additionally, the time bought by Washington's allowed France to marshal it forces, funnel more support to the colonists, and apply ever increasing pressure against the British in other quarters. The
Vietnamese also used time to their advantage. The longer the war dragged on, the louder the voices calling for withdrawal. Bui Tin, a former ARVN commander said, "[The U.S.
antiwar movement] was essential to our strategy…The American rear was vulnerable.
Every day our leadership would listen to the world news over the radio to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement…It gave us confidence in the face of battlefield reverses…America lost the war because of its democracy." 40 As in the case of the American Revolution, the time gained by the insurgents allowed their supporters to provide ever greater amounts of assistance. For the American operational commander facing an insurgency, time is the greater enemy.
Conclusion
The discussion above highlights the critical importance of external support as it relates to operational factors of time, space, and force in an insurgency. When faced with an insurgency, the operational commander must account for external support when developing his courses of action. The feasibility of removing that support is directly dependent upon the space occupied by the insurgency and the time allotted by the regime. counter it, this technology must be exploited. Its uses must be given more attention than the passing mention it is afforded in the new Counterinsurgency Manual (FM 3-24).
As populations shift away from rural areas and become more urbanized, identifying and isolating the enemy becomes increasingly difficult. In some cases, it may be impossible to attack the insurgents without incurring prohibitive civilian casualties.
This alteration of space means that the commander must seek other battlefields to face the insurgent. By employing more resources in the virtual space, the counterinsurgent can maximize his force in the actual. Just as the presence of external support is vital to the insurgent, its absence is deadly. Remove the support, and the chances of defeating an insurgency increase dramatically. Virtual warfare will not put an end to the grievances that gave rise to the movement any more than conventional warfare would. It will however, contribute to establishing a more secure environment which will permit constructive dialogue. 
